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1962/11/07

Policy Planning Council

November 7, 1962

TO

The Secretary

The Under Secretary

G - The Deputy Under Secretary

THROUGH:

FROM

S/P - Walt

SUBJECT:

Strategy for a Post-Crisis Cuba

I enclose a draft paper on the main elements of a proposed US-OAS strategy toward a post-crisis (Stage II) Cuba which was called for by Mr. McGeorge Bundy late last week and which is scheduled for consideration by the Executive Committee of the NSC this afternoon at Mr. Johnson's suggestion.

Prepared under forced draft by Henry Ramsey, and concurred in by me, it has been refined today in close collaboration at the ARA working-level (Mr. Arturo Morales-Carrion, Mr. Crimmins, Mr. Hurwitch) but has not been seen by Mr. Martin. It should therefore be considered only a draft of suggested strategy which looks beyond Stage II but furnishes our negotiators strategic guidance for what the track should be beyond the immediate crisis.

Copies of this draft are being forwarded through Mr. Brubeck to other members of the Executive Committee of the NSC.

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SEARET EYES OXLY

November 7, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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Attached is a Policy Planning Council draft of a proposed strategy for a post-crisis Cuba, as called for by Mr. McGeorge Bundy, and which we wanted to be available for this afternoon's meeting (at Mr. Johnson's suggestion). It has been refined in collaboration with the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs but has not been seen or approved by Mr. Martin.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET EYES ONLY

November 7, 1962

US STRATEGY TOWARD A POST-CRISIS CUBA

I, THE PROBLEM

Immediate minimum strategic objectives in the Cuban crisis are the dismantling, withdrawal and prevention of a subsequent build-up of offensive weapons systems under appropriate international verification procedures, including an acceptable form of ground inspection (Stages I and II as outlined to our negotiators at the UN). "Offensive weapons" should include the IL-28's, actual or potential base facilities for submarines with short-range rockets, as well as the missiles which provoked the crisis.

We have thus far focused on offensive weapons rather than on the future of Castro, though we have reassured the OAR's that the President's non-invasion pledge will not guarantee the Castro regime and that Castro's political and military ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc are not negotiable.

We cannot see clearly what will emerge beyond Stage II, since the Mikoyan negotiations and what we do or accept in effecting Stage II will affect the track beyond. It is likely that



that Mikoyan, in an effort to save Communism in Cuba will bargain offensive weapons other than missiles (e.g., IL-28's) and modalities of inspection for some expanded form of non-invasion commitment, or other guarantees, designed to shore-up the Castro regime and the Soviet presence. But regardless of Mikoyan's purposes, we must clarify our strategic objectives beyond Stage II in order to coordinate immediate negotiating problems with long-range strategy.

The problem is to examine the feasibility and risks of a maximal US strategy toward a post-crisis (Stage II) Cuba directed at the elimination (a) of the predominant Soviet presence and (b) of the Castro regime, including its old-line communist hardcore, by methods short of "invasion" as that be term is ultimately formulated.

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II, THE PRESENT SITUATION

Our strategy should be shaped from the following governing factors in the present situation:

1. A combination of conventional force and diplomacy forced Khrushchev to retreat to avoid a clash of conventional

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forces, in which he would have lost, and the possibility of escalation toward nuclear exchanges, in which he would also have lost. The same combination of forces which compelled the retreat is available to enforce our Stage II terms.

- 2. Soviet duplicity and Castro's dependence on Moscow are so firmly established, and the possibilities of clandestine build-ups of offensive weapons are sufficiently real, that we and the OAR's are justified in concluding that the Hemisphere will not be secure against the possibility of attack until the Soviets and Castro are eliminated from Cuba. Pending their elimination, we are justified in taking appropriate measures, under OAS doctrine, to safeguard against clandestine strategic build-ups or indirect aggression against the OAR's (inspection, aerial surveillance, quarantine, and other measures to isolate Cuba).
- 3. The Soviets, the Castro regime, and the Latin American communists generally are in a state of disarry from which we should not permit them to recover. We have never possessed a greater opportunity of discrediting Soviets and communists alike throughout the Hemisphere. Failure to press our advantage

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could be interpreted by the Soviets and OAR's as a failure of leadership and will and a sign of weakness.

- 4. If we pursue this opportunity judiciously and resolutely, we can very probably count on the support of the OAR including Brazil, though Brazil will need special attention. The OAR's are concerned lest the President's non-invasion pledge sustain Castro and they can be expected to cooperate in measures to contain indirect aggression and to safeguard against the further emplacement of offensive weapons. They can also be expected to support measures designed to weaken and further isolate Castro. Hemispheric solidarity behind American leadership is perhaps now even stronger than during World War II.
- 5. Relations between Moscow and Havana are strained and can be further exacerbated. Opportunities to make Cuba more unprofitable to the Soviets, and more risky in terms of post-crisis prestige, exist.

Though there are limits to the loss of face we want to impose on Khrushchev, there are even sharper limits on the amount of face we want him to save, and on any loss he might

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impose on us. We should not let Khrushchev or the world forget what he and his Cuban stooges tried to do to the US-CAS or conclude that his removal from the Hemisphere is too stiff a price to pay for his secretive strategem.

The amount of face we cause Castro to lose will bear directly on the security of his internal position and on his external influence.

- 6. Soviet behavior during recent months, Castro's oscillations with the communist apparatus, and the political and economic uncertainties flowing from US-OAS-Free World pressures will exert profound political effects on the Cubans in the months to come. Opportunities for resistance should arise in their wake: Splits in the leadership could occur as anci-Soviet Castroites and disenchanted Castroites move toward a purcr expression of Cuban nationalism; organized oppositions to the regime at provincial and local levels could also develop. We should prepare now for such eventualities and influence their shape.
- 7. There is no basis for believing that Castro is ten-





commitments. With or without Soviet support, there is every belief that Castro would be a neighbor we could not trust.

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8. We need more emphatic support of groups in and out of Cuba who, while anti-communist, favor economic and social change; and we need to affect the youth who now form the base of Castro's support but who may be encouraged to take to the hills. Emigres are in general a dangerous group to reinstate after a social revolution and dictatorship of Cuban magnitude, but they can doubtless be used more effective to open communications with dissident elements within Cuba.

III. OPTIONS OPEN TO THE SOVIETS

The present crisis centers on four US-OAS complaints against the Castro regime which arise from its links to the international Communist movement:

- It has permitted the Soviets to install offensive weapons systems.
- 2. It is dependent -- economically, politically, militarity on an extra-continental power which is committed to overthrow of the general system of values espoused throughout the OAR's.
 - 3. It has engaged in indirect aggression against certain (A)





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4. It is a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship which, in the Mexican (b) () (a) phrase confronts the American System with "ideological incompatibility".

The achievement of Stage II objectives will eliminate only the first complaint and the Soviets or Castro can do little to satisfy the other complaints while Cuba remains Communist. Mikoyan's negotiations could substantially eliminate the second but this seems questionable for face-saving ideological and bargaining reasons. No Soviet-Cuban guarantees with respect to complaints three: and four would be credible.

The Soviet options are essentially four:

- 1. To provoke a renewed major crisis over the interpretation of "offensive weapons", should the Soviets decide to stick on the IL-28's, submarine base facilities, and modalities of inspection This option may, on the other hand, be used as a negotiating pawn to drive the best US-OAS bargain possible for Castro and the Soviets. It is within our power to force the Soviets to abandon this option.
- 2. A new version of the status quo ante, in which offensive weapons are removed under various ad hoc verification procedures, but in which Moscow reenforces it commitment to





the Cuban revolution, seeks to maintain dominance over the revolution, and tries (possibly) to bargain for a maximum relaxation of Free World pressure on Cuba.

- 3. A Soviet-Cuban movement toward "neutralization" in which the Soviet presence would be phased down and Castro would be told to make the best terms he could with the Free World. This option might represent the long-range direction is of option 2 in a Soviet reassessment of the present crisis or as a result of an increased isolation of Castro and Cuba.
- 4. A complete Soviet disengagement accompanied by negotiating efforts to save Castro and persuade the Free World to coexist with him. This appears unlikely.

Other options are even more remote. A more intimate Soviet-Castro relationship (adherence of Cuba to the Warsaw Pact or a bilateral military pact and security guarantee) would, in the wake of the quarantine and the President's non-invasion pledge appear unnecessarily provocative and risky. Nor does it seem credible that the Soviets would now jettison Castro into ChiCom hands or permit a situation to develop whereby Castro disengaged

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from the Soviets and the communist apparatus in Cuba, even should Castro venture in this direction.

Some revisions of/2 or 3 are most likely to emerge from the interplay of Moscow and Havana, and it is to them to which US strategy should be mainly addressed, with the objective of moving the Soviets toward option 4.

IV. US STRATEGIC OPTIONS

A long-range strategy most compatible with the present hemispheric temper must be directed at removing the complaints which gave rise to the present crisis: We can normalize relations with a post-crisis Cuba only to the extent that the bases of complaints are relaxed. For reasons set forth in Section III, this is not a realistic expectation while a dominant Soviet presence or Castro remains in Cuba. Coexisted with Castro, should the Soviets disengage, is an unacceptable long-term option for the same reasons.

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A strategy designed to satisfy US and hemispheric interests should therefore combine:

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- 1. Pressure to reduce and eliminate the Soviet presence in Cuba and its hold over Castro, since the OAR's (notably including Mexico) find this incompatible with the American System, an unwarranted intervention in the internal affairs of an American state, and a continuing security threat.
- regime, since the American public will continue to demand this, since Castro cannot be trusted to change his spots, and since the OAR's are now shocked at the extent to which Castro has conspired with the USSR to threaten their security. Even if a neutralized Cuba without Castro should eventuate as a half-way house, we should not prior to this eventuality in any way commit ourselves to guarantees for the Castro regime
- 3. Continued post-crisis inspection (or pressure for it) and aerial surveillance within the letter of the October 23 Resolution of the COAS/OC, since post-missile Cuba, in association with the USSR, will possess a residual military capability susceptible to clandestine supply.
- 4. Insistence that Cuban waters and harbors (bases) be closed to Soviet submarines or naval vessels, since these

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could be equipped with short-range rockets or be clandestine conveyors of offensive weapons. (This problem could possibly be taken care of under the proposed Brazilian denuclearization resolution.)

the Cuban people, to Cuban dissidents and selected recugees,
and to anti-Soviet Castroites, to eliminate Castro and Castroism,

(1) (2) exercise self-determination, and return to the OAS.

This self-reenforcing strategy cuts several ways in our interest:

Keeping the pressure and public eye on the Soviet presence by inspection, surveillance or quarantine, preferably with OAS support, will maintain the presentmeasure of hemispheric solidarity and keep the focus of concern on the source of the Cuban crisis and the Hemisphere's underlying complaints against Castro. It undercuts Castro internally as one who is unduly dependent on a foreign power and isolated from his neighbors. Because of the interaction between the Soviet presence and Castro, it progressively allows Castro's position and prospects to deteriorate while compounding the costs, difficulties and

risks

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risks involved in the Soviets' continuing to underwrite his regime.

This strategy should not be applied only as an antiCommunist strategy. It should be dovetailed with efforts to
accelerate the Alliance for Progress and to present it as the
only acceptable way to controlled social revolution within the
American System. It should keep the focus on the unacceptable
risks to the Hemisphere of a continued Soviet and Castro presence in Cuba and it should progressively equate the two so inextricably that it will be clear that when one goes the other
must follow.

V, TACTICS UNDER DIFFERENT SOVIET OPTIONS

weapons" and modalities of inspection (perhaps combined with a Soviet security commitment to Castro). The exercise of this option would pose the gravest implications for US policy. If the Soviets-Cuba refuse ground inspection and/or to remove the IL-28's, our response should be to reserve freedom of action to return to the quarantine status as of October 27 -- as a minimum -- and to withdraw the non-invasion pledge.

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Should the Soviets-Cuba refuse verification that submarine bases are not or will not be completed, we should
point out that Soviet submarines with short-range rockets
are capable of clandestine supplies and are indistinguishable
in OAS eyes from an operational missile site, and reserve
freedom of action to return to the status of October 27.

2. Option 2: A new version of the status quo ante.

We should start from the premises that from the standpoint of

Soviet-Castro relations (a) the status quo ante can scarcely

be reestablished in terms of mutual confidence and popular

acceptance in Cuba of the Soviet presence, and (b) that our in
sistence during Stage II of adequate verification procedures

and post-crisis inspection rights can further exacerbate rela
tions.

We can further discredit Castro internally by standing pat (with OAS support) on (a) refusing to negotiate Castro's "five points", (b) insisting on adequate post-crisis inspection and aerial surveillance rights, and (c) heightening pre-crisis Cuban commercial and diplomatic isolation from the OAR's and Free World.

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The long-range political costs of withstanding these pressures, in terms of impingements on prestige and national sovereignty both to the USSR and Cuba, might persuade the Soviets gradually to disengage, especially if internal economic conditions continued to deteriorate and resistance developed which the US-OAS could support. Our purpose of inducing the Soviets to disengage might be accelerated by our making it clear at an appropriate time that we will not settle for coexistence with a Soviet-dominated Cuba or Castro.

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3. Option 3: A neutralized Cuba. A "neutralized Cuba under Castro would be an illusion unless the Soviets were able to persuade the Free World to share Soviet subsidies to Cuba It should be within our tactical resources to defeat the Soviets on this gambit while pushing them further along the disengagement track. In any negotiations instituted by the Soviets in the direction of neutralization, we should take firm tactical positions that (a) we would not guarantee a Castro regime in the long-term and (b) would not accept neutralization under Castro unless (i) the entire Soviet military presence departed and (ii) Cuba demilitarized. Castro obviously could not accept

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


the last condition for fear of encouraging resistance with which he could not cope: if he did, it should make it much easier to bring him down from within short of military invasion.

4. Option 4: Soviet disengagement accompanied by negotiations to guarantee the Castro regime. A genuine Soviet disengagement would leave Castro economically prostrate but with considerable military reserves. Our problem in this situation would be to liquidate Castroism and Communism in Cuba -- an artistic undertaking which might conceivably involve trades -- with as little internal disruption as possible But playing Castro out on the line toward the end of his destruction should not be confused tactically with any intention to coexist with him over the long-term. Tactically, we might in this situation agree to coexist with Castro in the short-term under conditions of his demilitarizing Cuba and moving toward free elections under OAS auspices ·· conditions which he could only accept at his peril.

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V. Timing



V. TIMING AND RISKS


The QAR's, important neutrals, and our allies would doubtless welcome the liquidation of the Soviet presence in Cuba and the Castro regime for the reasons that both offend OAS doctrine and heighten world tensions. This suggests that in Stage II we should negotiate positions which prepare the way for these strategic objectives.

Further, if the OAR's will go along with us (and all indications are that they will if we act while the Soviet threat and duplicity is at the front of their thinking), there could be advantages in informing the Soviets frankly that we will allow them a decent period of time to phase out and remove their technicians, but put them on notice that they will avoid further risks to their prestige by making a clean decision to observe the OAS restrictions on extra-continental presences in the Hemisphere.

The risks of this strategy should not be as great as those run by the quarantine. They could be minimized by a char Soviet reading of the fact that the OAS and important European allies of the United States were determined to make the costs of a

continued





continued Soviet presence in Cuba as high as possible and that hovering over the entire investment of treasure and prestige was the possibility of a selective quarantine which could bring Castro to his knees.

Our rationale for continuing and progressive pressures might not be as dramatic or convincing as in the case of offensive weapons but a united or near-unanimous stand on the part of the OAS against an extra-continental presence which threatened the Hemisphere once, and was guilty of gross duplicity, would go far in persuading world opinion to the proposition that the OAS under international law is prepared to take further appropriate measures such as progressive quarantine and inspection measures wounted to safeguard its security and self-defense.

VI. PARTIAL SCENARIO OF PROGRESSIVE POLITICAL MOVES

1. Stand firm for ground inspection, continued aerial surveillance and the elimination of IL-28's and the possibility of submarine bases in Cuban waters; and reserve full freedom of action to return to the October 27 status unless all offensive weapons as defined by us are withdrawn under acceptable

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international verification, and suitable safeguards are established to prevent further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

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- 2. Safeguard capabilities of assisting Cuban resistance under the President's "non-invasion" commitment as formulated in negotiating Stage II.
 - 3. Press at an appropriate time for OAS resolutions which will, vis-a-vis a post-missile Cuba advance general positions along these lines:
 - a. Declare a continued Soviet presence in support of the Castro regime incompatible with OAS doctrine and the American System.
 - b. Call upon Castro (within a reasonable time-limit) to liquidate the Soviet presence in Cuba and permit self-determination within Cuba upon penalty of severance of diplomatic and economic ties with those OAR's which now maintain relations and trade with Cuba, and denial of transit or over-flight privileges for Soviet aircraft.
 - c. Reserve, as now provided within the UN Charter and OAS doctrine, the right of individual and collective self-defense against threats posed by Cuba.



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- 4. Prepare capabilities and courses of action, including military, to assist resistance movements within Cuba.
- 5. It Cuba continues as a simmering crisis area with Soviet-Cuban behavior continuing to threaten vital US and hemispheric interests, consider at an appropriate time informing the Soviets that we will give them a respectable time to liquidate their presence and, if they do not, that we will reserve the right to institute a selective quarantine of shipping to enforce the OAS resolutions.
- 6. Devise selective courses of action to implement this general strategy with as wide a measure of support as can be obtained from Free World nations.
- 7. Coordinate this general strategy with a parallel strategy to move the Alliance for Progress forward in the wake of the Cuban crisis.
- 8. Prepare plans for US (and OAS) political and economic activities in Cuba after Soviet disengagement and the removal of Castro.

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
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Policy Planning Council November 7, 1962 The Secretary TO Tablian removad: The Under Secretary transferred to 0 1F4DPC G - The Deputy Under Secretary Gransferred to O/FAURO with additional access s/s centrolled by S/S THROUGH: Cat. C - Caption and custody retained by 5/5/6 Rostow FROM Reviewed by: Elijah Kelly Jr. Strategy for a Post-Crisis Cuba Date: 3 SUBJECT: I enclose a draft paper on the main elements of a proposed US-OAS strategy toward a post-crisis (Stage II) Cuba which was called for by Mr. McGeorge Bundy late last week and which is scheduled for consideration by the Executive Committee of the NSC this afternoon at Mr. Johnson's suggestion.

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
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
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
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
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A strategy designed to satisfy US and hemispheric interestrates should therefore combine:

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- 1. Pressure to reduce and eliminate the Soviet presence in Cuba and its hold over Castro, since the OAR's (notably including Mexico) find this incompatible with the American System, an unwarranted intervention in the internal affairs of an American state, and a continuing security threat.
- 2. Pressure short of invasion to eliminate the Castro regime, since the American public will continue to demand this, since Castro cannot be trusted to change his spots, and since the OAR's are now shocked at the extent to which Castro has conspired with the USSR to threaten their security. Even if a neutralized Cuba without Castro should eventuate as a half-way house, we should not prior to this eventuality in any way commit ourselves to guarantees for the Castro regime
- 3. Continued post-crisis inspection (or pressure for it)
 and aerial surveillance within the letter of the October 23
 Resolution of the COAS/OC, since post-missile Cuba, in association with the USSR, will possess a residual military capability susceptible to clandestine supply.
- 4. Insistence that Cuban waters and harbors (bases) be closed to Soviet submarines or naval vessels, since these

could be equipped with short-range rockets or be clandestine conveyors of offensive weapons. (This problem could possibly be taken care of under the proposed Brazilian denuclearization resolution.)

5. Coordinated OAS appeals (and selective support) to the Cuban people, to Cuban dissidents and selected refugees, and to anti-Soviet Castroites.

This self-reenforcing strategy cuts several ways in our interest:

Keeping the pressure and public eye on the Soviet presence by inspection, surveillance or quarantine, preferably with OAS support, will maintain the present measure of hemispheric solidarity and keep the focus of concern on the source of the Cuban crisis and the Hemisphere's underlying complaints against Castro. It undercuts Castro internally as one who is unduly dependent on a foreign power and isolated from his neighbors. Because of the interaction between the Soviet presence and Castro, it progressively allows Castro's position and prospects to deteriorate while compounding the costs, difficulties and

risks involved in the Soviets' continuing to underwrite his regime.

This strategy should not be applied only as an anti-Communist strategy. It should be dovetailed with efforts to accelerate the Alliance for Progress and to present it as the only acceptable way to controlled social revolution within the American System. It should keep the focus on the unacceptable risks to the Hemisphere of a continued Soviet and Castro presence in Cuba and it should progressively equate the two so inextricably that it will be clear that when one goes the other must follow.

V. TACTICS UNDER DIFFERENT SOVIET OPTIONS

1. Revival of crisis over definitions of "offensive weapons" and modalities of inspection (perhaps combined with a Soviet security commitment to Castro). The exercise of this option would pose the gravest implications for US policy. If the Soviets-Cuba refuse ground inspection and/or to remove the IL-28's, our response should be to reserve freedom of action to return to the quarantine status as of October 27 -- as a minimum -- and to withdraw the non-invasion pledge.

-B/AB

Should the Soviets-Cuba refuse verification that submarine bases are not or will not be completed, we should
point out that Soviet submarines with short-range rockets
are capable of clandestine supplies and are indistinguishable
in CAS eyes from an operational missile site, and reserve
freedom of action to return to the status of October 27.

2. Option 2: A new version of the status quo ante.

We should start from the premises that from the standpoint of

Soviet-Castro relations (a) the status quo ante can scarcely

be reestablished in terms of mutual confidence and popular

acceptance in Cuba of the Soviet presence, and (b) that our in
sistence during Stage II of adequate verification procedures

and post-crisis inspection rights can further exacerbate relations.

We can further discredit Castro internally by standing pat (with OAS support) on (a) refusing to negotiate Castro's "five points", (b) insisting on adequate post-crisis inspection and aerial surveillance rights, and (c) heightening pre-crisis Cuban commercial and diplomatic isolation from the OAR's and Free World.

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The long-range political costs of withstanding these pressures, in terms of impingements on prestige and national sovereignty both to the USSR and Cuba, might persuade the Soviets gradually to disengage, especially if internal economic conditions continued to deteriorate and resistance developed which the US-OAS could support.

BIAS (b) (i) (a)(s)

3. Option 3: A neutralized Cuba. A "neutralized Cuba under Castro would be an Musion unless the Soviets were able to persuade the Free World to share Soviet subsidies to Cuba It should be within our tactical resources to defeat the Soviets on this gambit while pushing them further along the disengagement track. In any negotiations instituted by the Soviets in the direction of neutralization, we should take firm tactical positions that (a) we would not guarantee a Castro regime in the long-term and (b) would not accept neutralization under Castro unless (i) the entire Soviet military presence departed and (ii) Cuba demilitarized. Castro obviously could not accept

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the last condition for fear of encouraging resistance with which he could not cope: if he did, it should make it much easier to bring him down from within short of military invasion.

Option 4: Soviet disengagement accompanied by negotiations to guarantee the Castro ragime. A genuine Soviet disengagement would leave Castro economically prograte but with considerable military reserves.

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V. Timing


V. TIMING AND RISKS

The OAR's, important neutrals, and our allies would doubtless welcome the liquidation of the Soviet presence in Cuba and the Castro regime for the reasons that both offend OAS doctrine and heighten world tensions. This suggests that in Stage II we should negotiate positions which prepare the way for these strategic objectives.

Further, if the OAR's will go along with us (and all indications are that they will if we act while the Soviet threat and duplicity is at the front of their thinking), there could be advantages in informing the Soviets frankly that we will allow them a decent period of time to phase out and remove their technicians, but put them on notice that they will avoid further risks to their prestige by making a clean decision to observe the OAS restrictions on extra-continental presences in the Hemisphere.

The risks of this strategy should not be as great as those run by the quarantine. They could be minimized by a char Soviet reading of the fact that the OAS and important European allies of the United States were determined to make the costs of a

continued



Our rationale for continuing and progressive pressures might not be as dramatic or convincing as in the case of offensive weapons but a united or near-unanimous stand on the part of the OAS against an extra-continental presence which threatened the Hemisphere once, and was guilty of gross duplicity, would go far in persuading world opinion to the proposition that the OAS under international law is prepared to take further appropriate measures such as progressive quarantine and inspection measures mounted to safeguard its security and self-defense.

VI. PARTIAL SCENARIO OF PROGRESSIVE POLITICAL MOVES

1. Stand firm for ground inspection, continued aerial surveillance and the elimination of IL-28's and the possibility of submarine bases in Cuban waters; and reserve full freedom of action to return to the October 27 status unless all offensive weapons as defined by us are withdrawn under acceptable

international




international verification, and suitable safeguards are established to prevent further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

BIAS Chilak

- 3. Press at an appropriate time for QAS resolutions which will, vis-a-vis a post-missile Cuba advance general positions along these lines:
- a. Declare a continued Soviet presence in support of the Castro regime incompatible with CAS doctrine and the American System.
- b. Call upon Castro (within a reasonable time-limit) to liquidate the Soviet presence in Cuba and permit self-determination within Cuba upon penalty of severance of dip-lomatic and economic ties with those OAR's which now maintain relations and trade with Cuba, and denial of transit or over-flight privileges for Soviet sircraft.
- c. Reserve, as now provided within the UN Charter and OAS doctrine, the right of individual and collective self-defense against threats posed by Cuba.





4. Prepare capabilities and courses of action,

- 5. It Cuba continues as a simmering crisis area with Soviet-Cuban behavior continuing to threaten vital US and hemispheric interests, consider at an appropriate time informing the Soviets that we will give them a respectable time to liquidate their presence and, if they do not, that we will reserve the right to institute a selective quarantine of shipping to enforce the CAS resolutions.
- 6. Devise selective courses of action to implement this general strategy with as wide a measure of support as can be obtained from Free World nations.
- 7. Coordinate this general strategy with a parallel strategy to move the Alliance for Progress forward in the wake of the Cuban crisis.
- 8. Prepare plans for US (and OAS) political and economic activities in Cuba after Soviet disengagement and the removal of Castro.

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